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Abstract
With the growing call for private sector actors to address global challenges, it is necessary to first assess whether regions 
with the greatest needs are accessing corporate philanthropy. In this paper, we ask whether corporate philanthropy is reach-
ing those with the greatest health-care needs. Drawing on economic geography and corporate homophily, we argue that 
corporate philanthropy tends to exacerbate health inequality as grants are destined for counties with fewer health problems. 
We test and find support for this hypothesis using data on health grants made by US corporate foundations and county-level 
health data. Our results that corporate health grants are less likely to go to counties which have a lower proportion of medical 
service providers and insured citizens suggest that corporate foundations are unwittingly complicit in worsening the resource 
gap between small, poor, rural counties and large, wealthy, urban counties. From an ethical perspective, we provide some 
guidance as to how this may be corrected.
Keywords Corporate philanthropy · Health inequality · Corporate social responsibility (CSR) · Homophily · Health grants
Private sector actors are 
influential and have the power 
to do much for global health 
equity. To date, though, initiatives 
such as those under corporate 
social responsibility have shown 
limited evidence of real impact. 
Corporate social responsibility 
may be a valuable way forward, 
but evidence is needed to 
demonstrate this.
(World Health Organization, 
2008, p. 15)
Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed the inequalities of the 
U.S. health-care system. Anecdotal evidence in New York 
City suggests that at least one public hospital’s intensive 
care units were required to use flimsy tarps and duct tape 
to separate patients, while wealthy private hospitals were 
able to use reserves and political clout to ramp up capacity, 
testing and acquire protective equipment. The embedded 
inequalities appear to have been exacerbated by corporate 
philanthropy. While doctors and nurses in public hospitals 
were obliged to create GoFundMe pages to raise money for 
protective gear, “the Mount Sinai health system was able to 
enlist private planes from Warren E. Buffett’s company to 
fly in coveted N95 masks from China” (Schwirtz, 2020).
According to (Reich, 2005, p. 26) the “primary motiva-
tion for charity has always been to provide for the poor and 
disadvantaged, and to attack the root causes of poverty and 
disadvantage.” Americans in 2017 donated $410 billion to 
charities of which 9% were health-related and 21% of these 
donations were by foundations and corporations (Nonprofits 
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Source, 2021). The World Health Organization defines 
health inequality as the difference in health status or the 
distribution of health determinants between different popu-
lation groups such as between people from different income 
groups or social classes (World Health Organization, 2017). 
The question we seek to address is: Does corporate philan-
thropy go to regions with the greatest health-care needs?
From a purely rational view, one would expect that a cor-
porate foundation’s philanthropic grant-making for health 
would be based on the needs of the recipient community. 
However, there exists significant concern that communi-
ties with higher needs, but fewer resources are often handi-
capped in competitive calls for proposals for health grants 
(Cantrell et al., 2008; Murday & Corley, 2008).
We argue that two related institutional conditions—
homophily and proximity—disadvantage communities with 
greater needs. Homophily captures the idea that people with 
certain characteristics tend to associate with others with sim-
ilar characteristics and is illustrated by the well-known apho-
rism, “birds of a feather flock together” (McPherson et al., 
2001). Proximity refers to the nearness or closeness of things 
in space, time, or attributes (Boschma, 2005). Generally, we 
will focus on geographic proximity, unless specified other-
wise. Homophily and proximity work to harm dissimilar and 
distant communities in two ways. First, homophily, or the 
lack thereof, between corporate foundations and recipient 
communities influences the choice of recipients (Kallman, 
2017; Spires, 2011), and the proximity of beneficiaries with 
respect to corporate operations and their foundations (Muller 
& Whiteman, 2016) alters the costs and benefits by reducing 
the costs of information search, and thus affects the target 
and amounts of foundation grants to beneficiaries. Second, 
homophily and proximity affect the institutions and legiti-
mating pressures to which corporate foundations are subject, 
thus affecting their giving behavior (Galaskiewicz, 1997; 
Marquis et al., 2007). In summary, homophily and proxim-
ity influence the incentives and constraints set by different 
institutional arrangements, thus affecting health equity.
We explore corporate philanthropy and its relationship to 
health inequality in the context of health grants made by US 
corporate foundations to determine whether these grants tar-
geted the counties with greatest needs or not. By health needs 
we refer to “the capacity to benefit” from effective interven-
tions and available resources (Wright et al., 1998, p. 1311). 
We examine the question by building a unique dataset drawn 
from data on grants by corporate foundations from Candid 
(formerly the Foundation Center), and data on health outcomes 
compiled for the County Health Rankings, a program of the 
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. First, we find significant 
differences in characteristics among counties, such that there is 
a negative relationship between health needs and the likelihood 
of grants received. Furthermore, contingent on receiving dona-
tions, counties with greater health needs are associated with 
fewer health grants per capita. Since this is an observational 
study and not a randomized trial, causality cannot be estab-
lished but a strong association is found. If causality were to 
be established, then grants from corporate foundations would 
be reinforcing pre-existing health inequalities such that needy 
counties, that is, those which have more uninsured citizens and 
where citizens have lower access to primary-care physicians 
and mental health providers, are less likely to be recipients of 
health-related grants from corporate foundations. We also find 
significant differences in U.S counties that receive corporate 
health grants, with recipient counties being more urban than 
counties that do not receive such grants. If a county is home to 
the headquarters of at least one corporation which has a foun-
dation, then its likelihood of receiving grants and the amount 
it receives are both significantly higher.
Our findings shed light on the mixed results of prior 
research, which have not used a rigorous approach to com-
pare the awarding of grants to urban versus rural counties 
(Ashley, 2014). Health researchers have found that rural 
Americans face persistent health disparities compared to 
people living in urban areas (Miller & Vasan, 2021) because 
rural Americans tend to have less access to health-care and 
experience high rates of disease and death (Cosby et al., 
2018). Our findings that corporate health-giving targets 
urban counties suggest that corporate giving may exacerbate 
such disparities. Given the latter, firms and their foundations 
need to change the criteria they employ in awarding funds 
if they seek to avoid reinforcing existing health inequalities. 
For example, an attractive grant application from a nearby 
location needs to be balanced against an assessment of need. 
Corporate foundations need to overcome what amounts to 
similarity bias due to corporate homophily. In addition, 
given that health inequalities are unfair, affect everyone, 
and are avoidable, and that interventions to reduce health 
inequalities are cost effective, both public and business pol-
icy should seek to reduce such inequalities (Woodward & 
Kawachi, 2000).
Our paper, seeking to determine how corporate founda-
tions allocate their philanthropy, is organized as follows. 
First, we develop our hypotheses calling on theories from 
economic geography and corporate homophily. Second, we 
describe the methods and data we employ to examine health 
inequality and the distribution of health grants. Finally, we 
provide a discussion of what this means for corporate phi-
lanthropy and what changes may be needed for corporate 
philanthropy to reduce health inequality.
Hypothesis Development
Traditionally corporate philanthropy has been consid-
ered a form of corporate social responsibility (CSR), 
which McWilliams and Siegel (2001) define as the private 
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provision of public goods and which managers undertake 
if its benefits are greater than the costs.1 Most research is 
confined to the financial impacts of CSR within the firm 
and fails to examine how those public goods are distributed 
(Barnett et al., 2020). So, it is necessary to look beyond a 
simple economic cost–benefit analysis of firm benefits to 
explain the distributional consequences of CSR initiatives, 
such as philanthropy by examining the regional preference(s) 
that foundations reveal when awarding CSR health-related 
philanthropic grants.
The resources available to firms to invest in CSR are 
scarce. The resource allocation approach to CSR (e.g., 
McWilliams & Siegel, 2001; Waddock & Graves, 1997) 
suggests that when firms allocate CSR resources, including 
those by their philanthropic foundations, they tend to target 
CSR and philanthropic activities that ‘fit’ the firm given its 
mission, size, and position in the industry (Burke & Logs-
don, 1996). Mackey et al. (2007) suggest that some forms of 
CSR may be substitutes for each other. In such cases, firms 
will allocate resources based on their preferences and/or, 
they argue, investor preferences (e.g., environmental CSR 
vs. employee CSR). If it were up to managers (with or with-
out the preference of equity investors), then several frame-
works exist to guide how their attention/resources should be 
allocated among different stakeholders based on such vari-
ables as power, influence, legitimacy, interests, and prox-
imity (Driscoll & Starik, 2004; Mendelow, 1981; Mitchell 
et al., 1997).
In this paper, we hold the type of CSR constant by high-
lighting health-related philanthropy in order to focus specifi-
cally on preferences revealed by specific allocations based 
on geography. Hence within the framework of resource 
allocation for CSR, we argue that homophily and proximity 
are particularly relevant considerations influencing resource 
allocation decisions. Mackey et al. (2007) suggest that this 
allocation is determined by the market and industry. How-
ever, given limited CSR resources, another critical prefer-
ence is revealed by which geographical areas receive grants 
from corporate foundations.
Homophily
One of the most common explanations for inequitable dis-
tribution is based on homophily, which is the principle that 
“contact between similar people occurs at a higher rate than 
among dissimilar people” (McPherson et al., 2001, p. 416). 
Homophily pervades social life. As Kossinets and Watts 
(2009, p. 405) explain: “Friends, spouses, romantic part-
ners, co-workers, colleagues, and other professional and 
recreational associates all tend to be more similar to each 
other than randomly chosen members of the same popula-
tion with respect to a variety of dimensions, including race, 
age, gender, socioeconomic status, and education.” This 
principle often lies behind the inequitable distribution of 
health outcomes because unhealthy individuals have fewer 
contacts with healthy individuals and thus access to healthy 
role models and information about adopting health inno-
vations, thus reinforcing poor health outcomes among the 
unhealthy (Centola, 2011).
Yet equally disconcerting is the role that homophily may 
play in influencing grantmakers in corporate foundations, 
resulting in allocative failures, which refer to a situation 
where “the outcomes of the social network [of foundations 
and beneficiaries] work against the ultimate goals of the net-
work itself through a structure that reproduces homophily in 
resource allocation” (Kallman, 2017, p. 754). In the case of 
organizations, organizational homophily suggests that peo-
ple in corporations and corporate foundations will be most 
attracted to potential beneficiary organizations that exhibit 
similar characteristics. For example, in a study of grant-mak-
ing by US foundations to Chinese civil society organizations, 
Spires (2011, p. 306) found such organizational homoph-
ily in decisions by US foundations to direct funding toward 
“elite-led bureaucratic organizations controlled by the Chi-
nese government and away from truly grassroots NGOs.”
In terms of grant-making, we expect that homophily will 
play a role insofar as corporate grant makers will be most 
interested in those proposals that best reflect the community 
norms used by the corporate foundations to determine what 
is an appropriate application (Marquis et al., 2007). Given 
homophily, grant proposals from areas which do not share 
the same community norms of professionalism, but may suf-
fer from more severe health problems and greater needs due 
to the lack of effective interventions or medical resources, 
may not be winning competitive grants because they may 
not have access to the kinds of professional grant writers or 
other advice and resources needed to prepare proposals that 
are consistent with the professional norms in major metro-
politan areas (Cantrell et al., 2008; Gautier & Pache, 2015). 
So unequal outcomes may be exacerbated by unequal capac-
ity. Hence, we conclude that health grants by corporate foun-
dations may reinforce existing health inequalities because 
they are not focused on the greatest need.
Homophily also shapes relational networks and thus the 
flow and diffusion of information. Within homophilous 
groups, the diffusion of information and opinions is quite 
rapid, but across groups, diffusion slows down (Golub & 
Jackson, 2012). This result suggests that the costs of infor-
mation search are reduced by reference to others who exhibit 
homophily. Lower search costs provide an advantage to 
1 In the case of philanthropy, an organization will donate funds if 
they believe the benefits, both monetary and non-monetary (e.g., rep-
utational and intangible benefits) are greater than the opportunity cost 
of using those funds for the next best purpose.
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members of homophilous groups. Hence, homophily reduces 
information costs by focusing search on similar organiza-
tions. In addition, homophily constrains the flow of infor-
mation and the network of contacts through which this 
information flows. Reduced costs and constraints thus lead 
to a tendency for corporate foundations to allocate greater 
CSR resources to homophilous beneficiaries. These factors 
will disadvantage potential recipients that are less similar, 
regardless of their manifest need for funding, resulting in a 
more inequitable distribution of health grants and, poten-
tially, of health outcomes.
Hypothesis 1: Counties with greater health needs receive 
less support from corporate foundations than counties with 
fewer health needs.
Proximity
One of the most significant sources of homophily is based on 
geographic proximity (McPherson et al., 2001). “The most 
elementary proximity hypothesis is that interaction increases 
with geographic/physical propinquity. Being proximate is 
thought to encourage chance encounters and opportuni-
ties for interaction, which can lead to the formation of new 
relationships and the maintenance of existing ones” (Rivera 
et al., 2010, p. 105). Although Driscoll and Starik (2004) 
also saw proximity as an important dimension of stakeholder 
salience, they focused on proximity in the context of the 
natural environment physically located near the firm and its 
facilities. In terms of the allocation of philanthropic grants, 
we argue instead that increased proximity engenders homo-
phily because it also reduces the effort or cost of information 
search (McPherson et al., 2001).
In addition to reducing the costs of information search, 
proximity also constrains the set of opportunities for interac-
tion between actors—in this case, between corporate founda-
tions and potential beneficiaries (Kleinbaum et al., 2013). 
These constraints shape the flow of information about opin-
ions, norms, and values relevant to the awarding of grants. 
Proximity thus fosters the formation of community cultures 
surrounding philanthropy (Galaskiewicz, 1997; Marquis 
et al., 2007).
Abundant research in economic geography finds that geo-
graphic proximity or a “home bias” influences many kinds of 
business activities, including investment (Coval & Moskow-
itz, 1999; Ivkovic & Weisbenner, 2009) and CSR (Husted 
et al., 2016). Investors and corporations prefer to invest in 
their hometowns. In the case of corporate philanthropy, most 
philanthropy is directed to headquarter cities, which tend to 
be large metropolitan areas, and already have greater wealth, 
resources, and capabilities than non-metropolitan areas 
(Davis and Henderson, 2008). McElroy and Siegfried (1986) 
found that for 229 large companies located in 14 cities, most 
corporate contributions were focused on their headquarters’ 
city. In addition, there tends to be a high interrelationship 
between corporations and local NGOs, which are the recipi-
ents of corporate largesse (Galaskiewicz, 1997).
Hence, proximity reduces information costs by limiting 
search to nearby organizations. In addition, proximity also 
constrains the flow of information and the network of con-
tacts through which this information flows. Reduced costs 
and constraints thus lead to a tendency for corporate founda-
tions to prefer nearby beneficiaries, which often tend to be 
more homophilous. These factors will disadvantage recipi-
ents that are more distant, regardless of their manifest need 
for funding, resulting in a more inequitable distribution of 
health grants and potentially health outcomes.
Hypothesis 2: Counties that are home to the headquarters of 
corporations which have foundations receive greater support 
than those with no corporate headquarters.
Methods
We tested our hypotheses by combining datasets from the 
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, which collects yearly 
county-level health data, and Candid (formerly Founda-
tion Center) which records all grants made by corporate 
foundations on a yearly basis. By focusing on actual grants 
made, we observe the revealed preferences of the corporate 
foundations, rather than their stated preferences (Samuel-
son, 1948). Specifically, Candid collects data on corporate 
giving of U.S. companies through their respective founda-
tions. The grant data are drawn from the IRS Form 990 s 
(Returns of Organization Exempt from Income Tax), which 
Corporate Foundations are required to report on an annual 
basis. These data only include cash disbursements from 
foundations to charities: nothing is mentioned or quantified 
in terms of in-kind donations or volunteer hours/efforts. 
Each observation from Candid is a specific grant made in 
a specific year from a corporate foundation. Alternatively, 
each observation is a specific grant received in a specific 
year by some charitable organization in a county. Candid 
records the donor’s name and location, recipient’s name and 
location (9-digit zip code), amount given and main activity 
area, which in our case is ‘health’. Using Census data, we are 
able to match the 9-digit recipient zip codes to 5-digit FIPS 
codes, which is used by the aforementioned Robert Wood 
Johnson Foundation data. As such, we are able to build a 
database at the county level, which links health needs to 
health-related corporate grants, along with other economic 
and socio-demographics variables. More specifically, we use 
data on corporate grants from Candid for the years 2009, 
2013 and 2017 and measure county-level health needs just 
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before these grants are made.2 Our approach is to look at 
corporate grants not from the grant maker’s end but rather 
from the recipient’s perspective. Our unit of analysis is, 
therefore, the panel county-year.
After accounting for missing variables for some counties 
(health needs in some years are unassessed), we have 3131 
counties (out of 3144 US counties registered) for which we 
observe data for at least 2 years. The total number of obser-
vations is 8027. County-level health grants in any year t 
are calculated by summing all health grants received by a 
county in year t  . Candid categorizes each grant according 
to its proprietary Philanthropy Classification System (PCS), 
which is slightly more nuanced and detailed than a recipi-
ent’s National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities (NTEE) code. 
We adopt a conservative approach by limiting our analysis 
to health grants, and within health grants we also omit all 
grants that relate to medical schools, scholarships, publica-
tions, and research. Examples of non-research-related health 
grants include antidiscrimination in health-care access, burn 
care, cancers (care, social services), domestic violence shel-
ters, emergency care, health insurance, mental health-care 
and counseling, obesity, prenatal care, school-based health-
care, substance abuse prevention, women’s services, and 
youth development and organizing.
Estimation Strategy
Our first hypothesis stipulates that counties with the greatest 
health needs are unlikely to receive health-related corpo-
rate grants, thereby reinforcing existing health inequalities. 
Our second hypothesis posits that counties with at least one 
headquarters of corporations with foundations receive more 
grants than those counties with no corporate headquarters. 
To test our hypotheses, we estimate the likelihood and the 
amount that counties receive in health-related corporate 
grants as a function of county socioeconomic and health 
needs, that is:
We are seeking to estimate both the likelihood (binary) and 
amount (continuous) of grants that a county, c, receives in 
year t contingent on its health needs in year t − 2 , whether 
the county has at least one HQ of any corporation with a 
foundation (to account for geographic proximity), and 
(1)
Grantsc,t =  +  ⋅ HealthNeedsc,t−2 + HQc + Zc,t−2 + UrbRurc + c,t
a vector of time-varying county-level controls (median 
household income, unemployment rate,% non-Hispanic 
African Americans,% Hispanic, Gini, Health-care costs 
per capita) denoted by Z, as well as a time-invariant control 
(Urban–Rural county categories). We proxy health needs by 
‘access to health-care’, i.e., the total number of providers of 
primary and mental health-care (access to health providers), 
as well as the percentage of uninsured adults in each county.
We first estimate Eq. (1) by pooling the data and adding 
in year fixed effects to the estimating equation. To analyze 
whether certain characteristics make them more likely to 
receive grants, and to analyze the level of grants received 
by counties as a function of county attributes, we use the 
two-part model for non-count data developed by Belotti et al. 
(2015). Two-part models are very common in count data 
(e.g., Cameron & Trivedi, 2013) where researchers first seek 
to analyze the likelihood of say, rain, and subsequently want 
to analyze the number of days it rained in a period of time. 
In this case, researchers can use the Poisson model or the 
negative binomial model. As our data are non-count data, 
a two-part model for non-count data is required. Here, the 
first part is used to analyze the likelihood of a county receiv-
ing grants via a logit model, and the second part is used to 
analyze the value of grants received conditional on grants 
having been received. The second part is calculated using 
OLS, and we log-transform the dependent variable (grants 
per capita) for ease of interpretation and because the grants 
data are highly dispersed. With the pooled data analysis, we 
cluster the standard errors at the county level.
Secondly, we estimate Eq. (1) using a population-aver-
age logistic estimator as well as a between-effects panel 
regression. We use population-average and between-effects 
because we are interested in the differences between coun-
ties, rather than the effect of changes within the county over 
time. For the span of years of our analysis, changes within 
the county are expected to be minimal. With these two panel 
data methods, we calculate standard errors using the boot-
strap method.
Variable Definitions
Health Needs The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation has 
amassed data on health-related variables across US counties 
since 2010. These data are sourced from several agencies in 
the US. We measure health needs with two measures. First, 
we create an index that sums the number of primary-care 
physicians and mental health providers per 100,000 peo-
ple for each county. We call this access to health providers. 
Second, we use the percentage of uninsured adults in each 
county. The Robert Wood Foundations lumps these meas-
ures into what it calls ‘access to care’. Higher access to 
care implies lower health needs in a county and vice-versa. 
The data on primary-care physicians are sourced from the 
2 Due to data availability, for grants made in 2009, health needs are 
assessed in 2006; for 2013, needs are assessed as an average of val-
ues in 2010–2011; for 2017, needs are assessed as an average of val-
ues in 2014–2016. Economic and Socio-demographics data are col-
lected two years prior to each year of grants. For sake of parsimony, 
the models in this paper will denote independent variables at $$t-2$$ 
for every year in which we observe health grants. The Robert Wood 
Johnson Foundation sources these data from various agencies in the 
US, some of which are mentioned in this paper.
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American Medical Association, whereas the data on mental 
health providers are sourced from the Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid National Provider Identification. The percent-
age of uninsured adults in a county comes from the Small 
Area Health Insurance Estimates.
Corporate Health Grants Corporate health grants are 
used as the dependent variable. In the first instance, we 
compare recipient counties with non-recipient counties and 
test whether county attributes, including health needs, affect 
the likelihood of receiving grants. In the second instance, we 
look at the value of grants per head received by a county as 
the dependent variable.
Additional health and demographic data As control var-
iables, we use measures obtained from the Robert Wood 
Johnson Foundation data. First, we include in our estima-
tion health-care costs per county per year (McCullough & 
Leider, 2016), which measure Medicare costs at the county-
year level. Such data, sourced from the Dartmouth Atlas 
of Health-Care, act as a control since counties spend dif-
ferentially on health-care for a variety of reasons and may 
therefore affect health outcomes. To control for demographic 
factors (McLaughlin and Stokes, 2002), we use (log of) 
median household income which is sourced from the Small 
Area Income and Poverty Estimates (SAIPE) and the unem-
ployment rate which we source from the St. Louis Federal 
Reserve, whereas population,% of non-Hispanic African 
Americans,% Hispanic are obtained from other US Cen-
sus Estimates. To account for income disparities within a 
county, we include county-level Gini coefficients, which we 
directly source from SAIPE (Shi et al., 2005). Further, we 
use the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) data 
to categorize counties into one of the following: (a) large 
central metro, (b) large fringe metro, (c) medium metro, (d) 
small metro, (e) micropolitan, (f) non-core.
Results
Summary Statistics
If we look at the distribution of counties per the urban–rural 
classification receiving health grants, Fig. 1 shows that 
almost 100% of all large central metropolitans received some 
health-related grants from corporate foundations. Around 
20–40% of large fringe metros, medium metros, and small 
metros received some grants, and the numbers are lower for 
micropolitans and non-core areas. Over the 3 years of analy-
sis, some trends are worth mentioning. First, our data from 
Candid shows that 2013 was the year where more (health) 
grants were made. In 2017, the number of corporate foun-
dation (health) grants fell quite dramatically, and the major 
losers of this overall decline were not large central metros. 
Rather, from 2013 to 2017, the proportion of recipient coun-
ties in each of the groups characterized as large fringe met-
ros, medium metros and small metros dropped by almost 20 
percentage points. Examining the average value of health 
grants (including zero) per capita by type of county, our 
calculations show, in Fig. 2, that large metropolitan counties 
receive a significantly higher amount than all other types 
of counties. In 2013, for example, on average large central 
Fig. 1  Proportion of counties 
per the urban–rural classifica-
tion, that received health grants
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metros received $2.50 per head in health grants from corpo-
rate foundations. This figure drops to under $1.00 for large 
fringe metropolitans, while medium, small metros receive 
approximately $0.25 per head, while micropolitans, and non-
core counties receive even lower amounts per head. Again, 
there is a time trend over the years. In terms of value, even 
large central metros received less in 2017 compared to 2013. 
Health grants per capita dropped from $2.50 per head to just 
over $1.00 per head.
To compare time trends across counties and across time, 
Table 1 presents summary statistics at the county-year level. 
Across all counties and all three years, the average number 
of health providers per 100,000 is 22.8. The average percent-
age of uninsured adults is around 17%. On average, only 
16.3% of all US counties received a health grant across our 
years of analysis. The summary statistics show that there 
are both within- and between- county variations in the data. 
Overall, across all variables, we note that the largest sources 
of variation in the data arise between counties rather than 
within counties, except for access to health-care providers. 
With regards to the dependent variable, there is high varia-
tion in corporate grants. Most counties receive zero grants, 
while some receive a significant amount per capita. We now 
examine the non-zero grants.
Figure 3 shows the distribution of the log of non-zero 
grants for each of the three years (same y-axis scale). The 
data show that most counties receive less than $1.00 per 
head (log of 1 = 0), and the distribution is slightly right 
skewed. The distributions of non-zero grants across each 
of the three years suggest that there is not much difference 
between the three years.
Likelihood of Receiving Grants and Amount 
of Grants Received Based on Health Status
To test hypothesis 1 with pooled data, we run the afore-
mentioned two-part model on Eq. (1) with standard errors 
clustered at the county level. Table 2 shows these results. 
The regressions show coefficients (not odds ratio) in two 
columns: the logistic first part results, and the OLS sec-
ond part results. These results confirm a few stark find-
ings. Counties with higher health needs (i.e., lower access 
to health providers and a higher percentage of uninsured 
adults) are less likely to be recipients of foundation health 
grants. Our pooled logistic regressions suggest that as the 
number of providers goes down by 10 for every 100,000 
people, the odds of receiving health grants goes down by 
12%.3 Similarly, as the rate of uninsured adults goes up, 
the odds of receiving health grants go down. For every one 
percentage point increase in the rate of uninsured adults, the 
odds of receiving health grants goes down by 9%. Richer 
counties denoted by higher median household incomes are 
more likely to be recipients of health grants. However, as 
unemployment goes up, the likelihood of receiving grants 
goes up. We also find that more unequal counties, which 
are those with higher Gini coefficients, are more likely to 
Fig. 2  Grants per head by type 
of county
3 Calculated as   (ecoef. − 1) * 100%
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Table 1  Summary statistics at 
County-year level
Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Access to health-care providers (# per 100,000 people)
 Overall 22.819 40.104 0.000 604.894
 Between 18.471 0.000 302.450
 Within 36.373 − 279.626 400.016
% Uninsured
 Overall 0.167 0.057 0.027 0.428
 Between 0.055 0.032 0.428
 Within 0.022 0.076 0.259
Health grants per capita ($)
 Overall 0.211 2.726 0.000 184.612
 Between 2.022 0.000 103.251
 Within 1.638 − 92.596 81.572
At least one corporate HQ in county (dummy variable)
 Overall 0.037 0.189 0.000 1.000
 Between 0.175 0.000 1.000
 Within 0.000 0.037 0.037
Counties that received grants (proportion)
 Overall 0.163 0.369 0.000 1.000
 Between 0.300 0.000 1.000
 Within 0.188 − 0.504 0.829
% Non-hispanic African Americans
 Overall 0.090 0.139 0.000 0.863
 Between 0.143 0.000 0.854
 Within 0.005 0.025 0.179
% Hispanics
 Overall 0.084 0.126 0.000 0.972
 Between 0.132 0.001 0.962
 Within 0.008 − 0.041 0.209
Log of median household income
 Overall 10.714 0.241 9.862 11.743
 Between 0.234 9.895 11.686
 Within 0.059 10.405 11.023
Unemployment rate (%)
 Overall 7.084 3.177 1.242 27.325
 Between 2.365 2.064 23.967
 Within 2.264 − 1.945 16.113
Gini
 Overall 0.441 0.035 0.332 0.599
 Between 0.033 0.344 0.598
 Within 0.013 0.327 0.549
Large central metro
 Overall 0.0254 0.157 0.000 1.000
 Between 0.145 0.000 1.000
 Within 0.000 0.0254 0.0254
Large fringe metro
 Overall 0.130 0.337 0.000 1.000
 Between 0.322 0.000 1.000
 Within 0.000 0.130 0.130
Medium metro
 Overall 0.131 0.337 0.000 1.000
 Between 0.324 0.000 1.000
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receive grants. A 0.01 increase in Gini is accompanied with 
a 20% increase in the odds of receiving grants. In terms 
of urban–rural classifications (not shown in the table for 
parsimony), larger counties are progressively more likely to 
receive grants than smaller ones.
Turning to the OLS regression, we note similar results 
in terms of access to health-care providers, but insignifi-
cant results (due to the clustering of standard errors at the 
county level) with regard to the percentage of adults unin-
sured. Conditional on receiving grants, a decrease of 10 
health providers for every 100,000 people is accompanied 
by a reduction of 2.1% in the value of health grants. In a 
nutshell, counties with greater health needs are less likely to 
receive grants, confirming Hypothesis 1 that counties with 
fewer health resources receive less support through corpo-
rate health grants than counties with higher levels of health 
resources. The positive trend we observed with unemploy-
ment in the logit model reverses such that counties with 
higher unemployment are more likely to receive grants, but 
such grants are lower in value than counties with lower lev-
els of unemployment.
Where then do foundations issue health grants? Hypoth-
esis 2, which states that the presence of a corporate HQ in a 
county increases the likelihood of receiving a health-related 
grant, is strongly supported. The odds of receiving a health 
grant goes up by more than 9 times when a county houses 
Table 1  (continued) Mean Std. Dev Min Max
 Within 0.000 0.131 0.131
Small metro
 Overall 0.122 0.328 0.000 1.000
 Between 0.318 0.000 1.000
 Within 0.000 0.122 0.122
Micropolitan
 Overall 0.221 0.415 0.000 1.000
 Between 0.403 0.000 1.000
 Within 0.000 0.221 0.221
Noncore
 Overall 0.370 0.483 0.000 1.000
 Between 0.494 0.000 1.000
 Within 0.000 0.370 0.370
Number of counties: 3131; number of observations: 8027
Fig. 3  Distribution of the log of 
(non-zero) health grants
 M. U. Boodoo et al.
1 3
the HQ of at least one company which has a grant-making 
foundation. The value of grants is also higher for counties 
that are home to at least one corporate HQ. Counties that 
have at least one corporate HQ receive on average 47% more 
in health grants per capita4 than counties in which there is 
no corporate HQ. Moreover, large central metropolitans are 
more likely to receive grants compared to other county types. 
Proximity to corporate HQ attracts more grants. Hypothesis 
2 is supported.
Our results are also supported using panel methods which 
are estimated with bootstrapped standard errors. In particu-
lar, we use xtlogit (i.e., generalized linear model with logit 
link and binomial family) in Stata with population aver-
ages, and we use between-effects xtreg. The panel methods 
estimates are generally smaller than the pooled OLS esti-
mates. However, the statistical significance does not change. 
Under the panel estimations, as the number of providers goes 
down by 10 for every 100,000 people, the odds of receiv-
ing health grants goes down by 4.5%. The relation between 
health providers and grants per capita is not statistically sig-
nificant anymore. With regards to the percentage of adults 
uninsured, a 1 percentage point increase in the proportion of 
uninsured adults is associated with a 3.5% reduction in the 
odds of receiving a grant.5 Similarly, a 1 percentage point 
increase in the proportion of uninsured adults is associated 
with 2.47% lower value of health grants per capita. The 
results for the presence of a corporate HQ in the county are 
similar to the ones reported in the pooled models.
Table 2  Two-part model with 
likelihood and amount of Health 
Grants per capita to counties
Standard errors clustered at county in parentheses for pooled OLS, bootstrapped std. errors for panel mod-
els
+ p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
Pooled data Panel methods
Logit OLS (with log) PA logit BE (with 
log)
Access to health-care providers (# 
providers per 100,000 people)
0.0121*** 0.00206+ 0.00451*** 0.00197
(0.00237) − 0.00106 (0.00101) (0.00125)
% Uninsured − 9.577*** − 2.183 − 3.598** − 2.496+
(1.333) 1.386 (1.102) (1.437)
At least one corporate HQ in county 2.286*** 0.388** 2.439*** 0.364*
(0.250) 0.144 (0.206) (0.163)
% Non-hispanic African American 0.882* 1.090* − 0.135 0.757
(0.417) (0.483) (0.513) (0.470)
% Hispanic 3.450*** 0.390 1.879*** 0.246
(0.415) (0.422) (0.379) (0.503)
Median household income 2.348*** 0.415 2.379*** − 0.117
(0.331) (0.328) (0.314) (0.386)
Gini 18.881*** 5.661** 18.09*** 3.863
(1.761) (1.744) (1.556) (1.579)
Unemployment rate 0.0912*** − 0.0558** 0.136*** − 0.0624***
(0.0222) (0.0182) (0.0157) (0.0177)
Urban–rural County classifications YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES – –
Observations 8027 1307 8027 1307
Wald chi-2 919.76 – 1254.67 309.74
Log (pseudo)likelihood − 2162.743 − 2155.614
Pseudo/adjusted R-squared 0.394 0.179 – 0.235
5 Because % uninsured is measured on a scale of [0,1], change in 
odds ratio is (e−0.03598 − 1).
4 Since the second part of the two-part model uses the log transfor-
mation of the dependent variable (health grants per capita), the inter-
pretation of the coefficient is (ecoef − 1)*100%.
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Robustness Checks
As a robustness check, in terms of methodology, we ran 
the same logistic model as before along with a tobit model. 
This combination of a logit/probit (binary outcome) with 
a tobit model (continuous outcome) is common practice in 
public policy literature. Specifically, these combinations 
are used to assess factors that determine grants received 
by municipalities (Dahlberg & Johansson, 2002) and local 
governments (Dubois & Fattore, 2011). Similar to gov-
ernment grant research, our data is zero-inflated with a 
majority of counties not receiving any grants. As such, we 
can say that the data is left-censored at zero. Results from 
these two regressions confirm exactly what we observed 
in our two-part model regressions.
A further concern with our paper is that perhaps our 
focused look at (non-research) health-related grants is too 
narrow. On the one hand, this focus allows us to be more 
precise in establishing a more direct link between cor-
porate philanthropy and health-care needs. On the other 
hand, it is plausible that grants in education, public safety, 
social sciences, arts and culture, and other areas along with 
health are all related to health needs. Using a more holistic 
approach, perhaps community development and education 
grants can alleviate inequality in health. We, therefore, 
run the same tests as reported earlier but this time with 
total corporate grants rather than health-related corporate 
grants. We still exclude all grants whose description con-
tains one or more of the words “research”, “publications”, 
“scholarships”. Considering all donations, 1583 counties 
received some grant for a total of 3333 county-year obser-
vations. Results are shown in Table 3.
Regarding Hypothesis 1, we find that on average a 
decrease of 10 health providers per 100,000 people is 
associated with a 4.2% lower likelihood of receiving some 
corporate donation. The OLS results show that, contingent 
on receiving grants, a decrease of 10 health providers per 
100,000 people is accompanied by a per capita reduction 
of 6.2% in the value of total corporate grants received by a 
county. At the same time, a 1 percentage point increase in 
the number of uninsured adults is accompanied by a reduc-
tion of 1.3% in the odds of receiving corporate grants, 
while the same 1 percentage point increase is associated 
with a 2.66% reduction in the value of grants received per 
capita. Overall, we can argue the same as we did before 
but with a bigger punch. Corporate grants in general are 
not going to the neediest counties.
With regards to Hypothesis 2, as expected, our results are 
even stronger when all corporate grants are considered. If a 
county has at least one corporate HQ, its odds of receiving 
any kind of corporate grant goes up by 21 times, whereas 
the value of grants it receives goes up by 205% per capita.
Discussion and Conclusion
The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed health inequalities in 
the United States. We would expect corporate philanthropy 
to provide for the poor and disadvantaged by addressing the 
root causes of these inequalities, not reinforce them. In this 
paper, we hypothesized and found that health-care grants 
by corporate foundations predominate in areas with lower 
health-care needs, such that counties which have fewer 
uninsured citizens and where citizens have greater access 
to primary-care physicians and mental health providers, are 
the more likely recipients of health-related corporate grants. 
Further, even among the “winners”, more health grants are 
awarded to counties with less severe health needs. There is 
a strong association between counties that receive health 
grants and counties where the foundation’s corporate head-
quarters is located.
Theoretical Implications
We find evidence that two factors are associated with the 
severity of health problems. First, corporate giving is gen-
erally focused on the local community, which for corporate 
Table 3  Robustness checks using all grants
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses, +p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, 
**p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
Panel methods
PA logit BE (with 
log)
Access to health-care providers (# 
providers per 100,000 people)
0.00420*** 0.00621***
(0.000657) (0.00123)
% Uninsured − 1.279+ − 2.695**
(0.769) (0.870)
At least one corporate HQ in county 3.052*** 1.116***
(0.598) (0.161)
% Non-hispanic African American − 0.270 0.875***
(0.296) (0.282)
% Hispanic 0.415 0.646+
(0.361) (0.350)
Median household income 2.051*** 0.115
(0.187) (0.239)




Urban–rural County classifications YES YES
Observations 8027 3333
Wald chi(2) 1336.98 873.82
Adjusted R-squared – 0.274
 M. U. Boodoo et al.
1 3
foundations tends to be large metropolitan areas, and which 
has the consequence of reinforcing the “rural–urban health 
divide” (Miller & Vasan, 2021). Our finding that the odds of 
receiving a health grant goes up by more than 9 times when 
a county houses a HQ of at least one company that has a 
grant-making foundation suggests that proximity matters. 
Second, corporate foundations are more likely to fund grant 
applications emanating from well-resourced counties and 
NGOs. The implication of both tendencies is that corporate 
health philanthropy tends to reinforce pre-existing health 
inequalities and even exacerbate them.
Although these findings do not conclusively establish 
causality due to the lack of randomized trials, they strongly 
suggest that corporate philanthropy is inadvertently wors-
ening inequities in the distribution of health grants in rural 
vs. urban counties in the United States. Instead of assum-
ing that CSR and/or philanthropy are inherently good, the 
social impacts need to be established independently, rather 
than be assumed. This opens up an entirely new question 
for CSR research: Under what conditions does CSR gen-
erate positive social impacts? This question is consistent 
with the pragmatic approach recommended by (Margolis 
& Walsh, 2003), when they suggested that research should 
be reoriented to investigate the social impacts of corporate 
practices like CSR and then determine how these practices 
could be improved to increase social impact. Sadly, almost 
twenty years after (Margolis & Walsh, 2003), the literature 
fails to address the fundamental question of whether CSR or 
philanthropy actually generate positive social impact (Bar-
nett et al., 2020). Given the strong evidence provided in this 
paper that health grants by corporate foundations appear 
to increase inequity, the literature must move forward to 
study the impacts of social initiatives and develop theory 
to explain when such initiatives will have positive impacts 
and when not.
Normative Implications
From several normative perspectives, this distribution of 
health grants seems unfair. If we look at Rawls’ well-known 
difference principle of justice, it reads: “Social and economic 
inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) open 
to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity, and 
(b) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged…” (Rawls, 
1971, p. 266). Caring for the least advantaged should be a 
priority in policy about the distribution of health resources 
and would require corporate foundations to direct grants to 
counties with the greatest needs. Moving beyond Rawls’ 
focus on the distribution of advantages, Sen (2008) notes 
that Rawls does not take into account differences in the abil-
ity of people to turn these advantages into a good life. Work-
ing within this “capability approach,” Nussbaum (2011) spe-
cifically includes good health as a capability that a political 
order must ensure for human dignity. If having good health 
is a basic requirement for a just society, corporate founda-
tions should align their giving so that those with greater 
health needs are able to obtain good health.
Practical Implications
Unwittingly, corporate foundations may be complicit in 
worsening the health resource gap between rural, small, poor 
counties and more wealthy, large, urban counties. Instead of 
going to places where the need is greatest, funding appears 
to go to places where the need is less, but which are closer 
or more similar to home. Grant recipients located in the 
same county as a large corporate headquarters would benefit 
from this location bias. But if corporate foundations want 
to achieve the greatest benefit from their donation dollar, 
they should change the criteria for awarding funding. Lantz 
(2019, p. 38) argues that there are “institutional, systemic, 
and public policy drivers of population health problems and 
distributional disparities” which need to be considered.
Clearly an assessment of the severity of health needs 
should be at the center of the decision criteria for awarding 
health grants. Corporate foundations need to overcome what 
might amount to a “similarity bias.” Not only are health 
inequalities unfair, affect everyone, and avoidable, but health 
interventions to reduce health inequalities are cost effective 
(Woodward & Kawachi, 2000). To put the “love of human-
ity” back in corporate philanthropy, corporate foundations 
should become aware of the implicit bias that might be 
driving their funding decisions and actively work to reduce 
inequalities in health grants.
Philanthropist MacKenzie Scott modeled such a needs-
based approach in her recent donation of over four billion 
dollars to non-profits and community organizations through-
out the United States (Scott, 2020). To assist her in the distri-
bution of these donations, she assembled a panel of experts 
who “took a data-driven approach to identifying organiza-
tions with strong leadership teams and results, with special 
attention to those operating in communities facing high 
projected food insecurity, high measures of racial inequity, 
high local poverty rates, and low access to philanthropic 
capital” (Scott, 2020). She donated to universities, but not 
the usual suspects like Harvard University or Stanford, but 
Navajo Technical University and Texas A&M International 
University. Essentially, she took the similarity bias seriously 
and maintained a highly focused effort to donate to organiza-
tions in all 50 states, D.C. and Puerto Rico based on need 
and potential impact.
Limitations and Future Research
Notwithstanding the above analysis, this paper is not without 
limitations. First, although we find that physical distance 
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from corporate foundations increases health inequality, the 
COVID-19 example cited in our introduction regarding 
the two hospitals suggests that there may also be cultural 
distance between donors and recipients that needs to be 
examined. A deeper look at the geographical, cultural, and 
ideological distance between donor and recipient is needed. 
Second, grants made through corporate foundations are not 
the only grants received by US counties. Some counties may 
be receiving direct support from private companies, support 
from foundations sponsored by philanthropists, and other 
forms of support. Such data are difficult to source but could 
support or reject our claims about homophily. Third, this 
paper has not accounted for the particular set of micro-level 
mechanisms that could explain why grants are awarded to 
certain recipients. Fourth, homophily is not constant over 
time. Homophily has explained why people are attracted to 
similar others, but we do not account for how homophily 
varies over time. Failure to account for variation in homo-
phily is a limitation, but a critical question as it would help 
provide solutions to the problems it generates.
These limitations, in our opinion, should be the work of 
further research. To our knowledge, ours is the first paper 
to empirically assess the unequal distribution of corpo-
rate grants. Our results should provide grounds for future 
research. For example, one implication of our research is 
that the “marginal benefit” of corporate giving on health 
outcomes may be negative if it exacerbates the inequality 
of health resources. This effect would need to be studied in 
a separate paper, given the challenges of detecting health 
outcomes at the county level based on foundation grants to 
organizations within the county. In addition, our analysis 
treats homophily as a constant, but future research needs to 
explore what factors enable individuals and organizations 
to counteract the tendency to be attracted to similar others. 
An understanding of these factors would require examining 
the cognitive processes of decisionmakers and would require 
data beyond the type and amount of grants made. Finally, 
our entire analysis was based on health. While this is a very 
important area, possibly the most important aspect of human 
welfare, other dimensions such as income inequality and 
education deserve attention as well.
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